Sharleen M. McReynolds v. Glenn L. McReynolds: Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Sharleen M. McReynolds v. Glenn L. McReynolds:
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
D. David Lambert; Howard, Lewis & Petersen; Attorneys for Appellant.
Richard B. Johnson; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Sharleen M. McReynolds v. Glenn L. McReynolds, No. 890172 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1710
, U 1 AH 
f'DOO 
1 II 1 t! 
1 '' • 
50 
A"i0 
MEM"!" 
APPEALS 
THE STATE 
;: : in :: i !| : I I ! "I r? ?:::: r 
| ; 4 P"! I! ' 1 • '" 
1! ill: II IP RLl' I' INI III Ill , l " l ' i llh III I l l Ill ill I 
i in I 11 11 in mi ii in mi in. |i< Case WM 8B90172-K 
G L E N * •, Category No. 1)4 
ii 11111 n i 1111 1111M i H i 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF 
~
m
"
 TSTRICT COURT OF UTAH i 
All, THE HONORA§§ 
3ALLIF, PRESIDIliP 
HOWARE 
120 Ea 
Provo. w 
* I 11II l l l l I 
ATTORN; 
APPE :IWT 
' I - i l l 1 , III II ' ill 1111 1 III 1 I II 
, (III 111 III 11 I l l l l III 111 I1 II 1 1 111 III 111 
11 1 I 11 III III III III III III II1 III 11 
I I I Ill I I I t i l l I I I II 111 (III 
l" II II Il  llll llll llll III llll llll llll II llll llll II llll llll III IIII llll III f -
1 1 1 I 111 III I III III 1 III' 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHARLEEN M. McREYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GLENN L. McREYNOLDS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 890172-CA 
Category No. 14b 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, PRESIDING. 
D. DAVID LAMBERT, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 3 00 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON, for: 
JOHNSON & JACKMAN 
1327 S. 800 E. #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT-
RESPONDENT 
LIST OF PARTIES 
The caption contains a complete list of all the parties to 
the proceeding. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings. . 1 
B. Statement of Facts 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
POINT I 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS DECLARED THAT CHILD 
SUPPORT IS THE RIGHT OF A CHILD AND PAYMENT OF 
SUPPORT MAY NOT BE CONDITIONED UPON ISSUES OF 
VISITATION 6 
A. Even Extreme Conduct by a Party in 
Denying Visitation of Minor Children 
Will Not Excuse Payment of Support by 
the Parent Denied Such Visitation. . . . 6 
B. The Majority of Other Jurisdictions are 
in Accord With the Utah Position on the 
Issue of Child Support. 10 
C. A Non-custodial Parent has Proper 
Remedies to Enforce Visitation Rights. . 12 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S RECOVERY IN THE PRESENT CASE IS NOT 
BARRED BY LACHES, ACQUIESENCE OR EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL 13 
CONCLUSION 16 
ADDENDUM 
11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES Page: 
Appert v. Appert. 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986) . . 11 
Brovles v. Broyles. 711 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 1985) 11 
Coleman v. BurnettP 169 Ga. App. 297, 312 S.E.2d 627 
(1983) 11 
County of Clearwater, Minn, v. Petrash. 198 Colo. 231, 
598 P.2d 138 (1979) 10 
Earl v. Earl. 17 Utah 2d 156, 406 P.2d 302 (1965) 8 
Flvnn v. Flvnn. 15 Ohio App. 3d 34, 472 N.E.2d 388 (1984) . . 11 
Gruber v. Wallner. 198 Colo. 235, 598 P.2d 135 (1979) . . . . 10 
Gullev v. Gullev. 570 P.2d 127 '(Utah 1977) 7 
Hansen v. Gossett. 590 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1979) 8 
Hester v. Hester. 663 P.2d 727 (Okla. 1983) 11 
Irbv v. Irbv. 629 P.2d 813 (Okla. App. 1981), 
overruled by Hester v. Hester. 663 P.2d 727 
(Okla. 1983) 11 
Larsen v. Larsen. 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P.2d 596 
(Utah 1956) 13-16 
Marie C. G. v. Guy L.. 133 Misc. 2d 291, 
506 N.Y.S. 2d 547 (1986) 11 
Matter of Marriage of Dooley. 30 Or. App. 989, 
569 P.2d 627 (1977) 12 
McClure v. Powell. 15 Utah 2d 324, 392 P.2d 624 (1964) . . . 9 
Peterson v. Peterson. 530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974) 13 
Petition of R.H N.. 710 P.2d 482 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) . . . 10 
Race v. Race. 740 P.2d 253 
(Utah 1987) 4, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16 
Reeves v. Reeves. 556 P.2d 1267 (Utah 1976) 8 
State ex rel. Southwell v. Chamberland. 361 N.W.2d 814 
(Minn. 1985) 11 
iii 
State ex rel. Williams v. Williams. 647 S.W.2d 590 
(Mo. App. 1983) 11 
Wasescha v. Wasescha. 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976) 15, 16 
Woodward v. Woodward. 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985) 7 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 9 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4 7 
iv 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHARLEEN M. McREYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GLENN L. MCREYNOLDS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 890172-CA 
Category No. 14b 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an Order and Judgment and from 
post-trial rulings following a trial to the bench concerning 
delinquent child support. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1988). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the trial court err in failing to award judgment for 
the unpaid amount of child support owed by the defendant? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings. This 
is an action upon plaintiff's petition filed August 4, 1986, to 
recover unpaid child support from the defendant, who is the ex-
husband of plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff sought a modifica-
tion of the divorce decree to increase the amount of child 
support payments and to enforce other provisions of the divorce 
decree. (R. 55.) 
In a bench trial, the trial Court found a substantial 
change of circumstances and ordered an increase in child 
support. (R. 284-85.) The Court adopted a Stipulation by the 
parties of unpaid child support through July, 1986, and awarded 
judgment in that amount. The Court also determined the amount 
of unpaid child support from August, 1986, through May, 1988, to 
be $3,520.00, but then refused to award judgment for that 
amount. (R. 283-84.) Plaintiff then filed a Motion For a New 
Trial or Amendment of Judgment on November 7, 1988 (R. 298), 
which motion was denied by the Court's Ruling of February 21, 
1989 (R. 326). Plaintiff thereafter perfected this appeal, 
which goes only to the issue of judgment for unpaid child 
support from August, 1986, through May, 1988. 
B. Statement of Facts. The plaintiff and defendant in 
this case were divorced on March 7, 1984 pursuant to a decree 
entered in Evans ton, Wyoming. (R. 28.) On June 29, 1984 an 
Order and Judgment was entered in Davis County, Utah, pertaining 
to those matters not adjudicated by the Wyoming decree. (R. 52-
54.) Those matters included the care, custody and control of 
the minor children of the parties, visitation for the defendant, 
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child support, alimony, debts and a division of marital prop-
erty. (R. 52-54 0 
From the date of the entry of the original child support 
order on June 29, 1984, until the date of plaintiff fs petition 
for a judgment for delinquent child support on August 4, 1986, 
defendant paid plaintiff no child support whatsoever. (R. 346-
347.) After plaintiff filed her petition, defendant made a 
partial payment toward delinquent child support, leaving a 
support delinquency in the amount of $1,120.00 through July, 
1986. (R. 241-242, 445-446.) 
Prior to the trial below, the trial court entered a 
pretrial order establishing the amount of unpaid child support 
through July, 1986, in the amount of $1,120.00. This pretrial 
order specified all issues to be tried and contempt of the 
plaintiff was not listed as an issue. (R. 241-243.) On May 18, 
1988, the Court heard testimony concerning the issues set forth 
in the Pretrial Order, including the amount of unpaid child 
support for the period of August 19, 1986, through May, 1988. 
(R. 242.) After hearing the evidence, the Court adopted the 
Stipulation of the parties relating to the amount of unpaid 
child support through July of 1986, and incorporated the 
following findings into its Order and Judgment: 
2. The Court concludes that the 
amount to which the plaintiff would 
otherwise be entitled for child support 
accruing from August, 1986 through the 
end of May, 1988, is the sum of 
$3,520.00. 
(R. 284, para. 2; Addendum.) 
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The trial court then refused to award judgment for the 
above-determined amount of unpaid child support based upon the 
following additional findings: 
3. The Court concludes that the 
plaintiff and her current husband have 
purposefully intimidated the defendant 
and frustrated his attempts to visit 
with his children by repeatedly changing 
their address and telephone numbers, 
forcing calls about the children through 
plaintiff's present husband and a law 
firm answering and forwarding facility, 
and have not cooperated in meeting 
scheduled telephone calls from defendant 
and the children as ordered by Domestic 
Relations Commissioner, all of which 
have caused defendant considerable 
anxiety, expenditure of time and expense 
which could have been avoided by 
reasonable efforts on the part of 
plaintiff and her husband to afford him 
his visitation rights. 
4. In that regard, the Court con-
cludes that the claims of the defendant 
are substantially true as it related to 
his frustrated visitation with his minor 
children over a period of time from July 
of 1986 to the present time. The Court, 
therefore, concludes that the accrued 
support for the period between July and 
the present time as found in the sum of 
$3,520.00 cannot, in good conscience, be 
allowed the plaintiff because of the 
conduct of the parties in which she has 
been principally responsible in denying 
the rights of visitation to the 
defendant. 
(R. 284, para. 3 and 4; Addendum.) 
The plaintiff made a motion for a new trial or for an 
amendment of the judgment based principally upon the case of 
Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253 (Utah 1987), and a line of prior Utah 
cases which have held that denial of visitation may not be used 
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as a means of eliminating a child support obligation. (R. 289-
295, 298.) The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion and 
refused to amend the order and judgment. (R. 326.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The compelling public policy concern of insuring that 
children are properly supported by those having responsibility 
for them is reflected in the Utah Supreme Court's emphatic 
declaration that child support is the right of a child and 
payment of support may not be conditioned upon issues of 
visitation. Enactments of the Utah Legislature and a series of 
Utah Supreme Court cases reinforce the important public policy 
that child support is a possessory right of a child quite apart 
from issues relating to the conduct of the divorced parents. 
Since child support payments are an entitlement of the child, 
they are to be insulated from intrusion, including visitation 
right disputations, no matter how egregious the conduct of a 
parent may be. Utah does not stand alone in this position. In 
fact, the majority of jurisdictions are in accord with the 
position that a violation of visitation rights does not suspend 
a non-custodial parent's support obligation. Rather, a non-
custodial parent has remedies available through the courts to 
enforce visitation rights without interfering with the welfare 
of the child. 
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A few older Utah cases seem to suggest that a custodial 
parent may be barred from trying to reimpose support obligations 
on a non-custodial parent where the custodial parent voluntarily 
assumes that obligation in exchange for consideration. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that the rationale underlying such 
decisions is weak, and the circumstances under which such a 
waiver or estoppel would come into play are rare. Moreover, 
these cases have been superceded by the more recent authority 
recognizing the superior rights of the child to receive support. 
The facts of the present case would not give rise to a claim of 
waiver or estoppel. 
For these reasons, the trial court erred in refusing to 
award judgment for the unpaid child support. The decision of 
the trial court should be overturned and judgment for the unpaid 
child support should be awarded to plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS DECLARED THAT CHILD SUPPORT 
IS THE RIGHT OF A CHILD AND PAYMENT OF SUPPORT 
MAY NOT BE CONDITIONED UPON ISSUES OF VISITATION. 
A. Even Extreme Conduct bv a Party in Denying Visita-
tion of Minor Children Will Not Excuse Payment of 
Support bv the Parent Denied Such Visitation. 
Recently, the Supreme Court of Utah considered a situation 
where the trial court conditioned payment of child support on 
the development of a visitation schedule. In overturning the 
trial court on that issue the Supreme Court held: 
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Although the awarding of visitation and 
child support is within the court's 
discretion, the court must consider the 
child's paramount right to and need for 
his parents' support. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-45-3 and -4; Woodward v. Woodward, 
709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985). Court-ordered 
child support is an obligation imposed 
for the benefit of the children, not the 
divorcing spouse. 
Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253, 256 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). 
In Race, the mother had been held in contempt by the trial 
court for her refusal to allow the defendant to exercise his 
visitation rights. Even in the face of this contempt citation, 
however, the Utah Supreme Court refused to allow child support 
payments to be used as a method of coercing visitation. This 
demonstrates the strength of the proposition that support 
obligations are imposed for the benefit of the children and are 
not to be tampered with based on the misconduct of a parent. 
The policy reasons underlying the position of the Utah 
Supreme Court are well founded and have been articulated by the 
courts and the legislature for many years. The Utah legislature 
has emphatically and unequivocally declared that "every man 
shall support his child." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3 (1987). 
That same year, the Utah Supreme Court held that a parent cannot 
rid himself of his duty of support even by purporting to 
transfer it to another individual by contract. Gullev v. 
Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977). In earlier cases, the Utah 
Supreme Court has declared that "the right of a child to support 
is a paramount right which it possesses quite apart from any 
consideration relating to the conduct of its divorced parents," 
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Earl v. Earl, 17 Utah 2d 156, 406 P.2d 302, 303 (1965); "child-
ren are unconditionally entitled to support from their parents," 
Reeves v. Reeves, 556 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Utah 1976); and "[t]he 
right to child support is a right of the children themselves," 
Hansen v. Gossett, 590 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1979). 
The state has a compelling interest to insure that the 
rights of minors are fully enforced, particularly since minors 
are most often without the means to enforce those rights 
themselves. Paramount among these rights is the right to 
receive support from one's parents. When that right of support 
becomes a bargaining chip in a conflict between parents, then 
the rights of the child are trampled upon and the child is 
victimized. 
In 1987, the Utah legislature enacted a law making each 
installment of child support a judgment. The pertinent portions 
of that enactment are as follows: 
(1) Each payment or installment of 
child or spousal support under any child 
support order, as defined by Subsection 
78-45d-l(3) [now 62A-11-401(3)], is, on 
and after the date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same 
attributes and effect of any judgment of 
a district court, except as provided in 
Subsection (2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to 
full faith and credit in this and any 
other jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive 
modification by this or any other 
jurisdiction, except as provided in 
Subsection (2) . 
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(2) A child or spousal support payment 
under a child support order may be 
modified with respect to any period 
during which a petition for modification 
is pending, but only from the date 
notice of that petition was given to the 
obligee, if the obligor is the petition-
er, or to the obligor, if the obligee is 
the petitioner. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (1987). 
While the above statute does not cover the entire period 
for which delinquent child support is sought in the present 
case, it indicates the desire of the Utah legislature, which 
reflects public policy, to preserve child support against any 
interference. The statute accomplishes this by giving to each 
installment of child support the full force and effect of a 
court judgment. 
Another Utah Supreme Court case which was decided in 
identical fashion to Race, but was decided many years earlier, 
is the case of McClure v. Powell, 15 Utah 2d 324, 392 P.2d 624 
(1964). In that case, the custodial parent (the mother) 
concealed herself and the children from the father. The trial 
court found that the father failed to provide support only 
because he could not locate his ex-wife and children. Despite 
the conduct of the custodial parent, the trial court and the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the father was not relieved of his 
support obligation, although principles of equity did relieve 
him of the obligation to pay interest on the amounts which had 
become due. 
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The courts and legislature of Utah have repeatedly and 
forcefully articulated the policy that child support payments 
are an entitlement of the child, not of the custodial parent, 
and as such, are to be insulated from intrusion, including 
disputation over visitation rights. Plaintiff-appellant 
respectfully submits that Race v. Race is controlling in the 
present circumstances and that the trial court erred in failing 
to award judgment for the $3,520.00 in unpaid child support. 
B. The Majority of Other Jurisdictions are in Accord 
With the Utah Position on the Issue of Child 
Support. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado recently held: 
Although a trial court has the 
discretion to consider a parent's 
mistaken belief that child support is 
conditioned on visitation rights as a 
factual circumstance in deciding whether 
a parent has failed without cause to 
provide reasonable support, [citation 
omitted], a violation of visitation 
rights does not legally suspend the 
obligation to support one's children. 
County of Clearwater, Minn, v. Petrash, 
198 Colo. 231, 598 P.2d 138 (1979); 
Gruber v. Wallner, 198 Colo. 235, 598 
P.2d 135 (1979). 
Petition of R.H.N.. 710 P.2d 482, 488 (Colo. 1985) (en banc). 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma overruled an earlier 
Oklahoma Court of Appeals case which had excused child support 
for the period that the mother had refused to allow the father's 
visitation. In so doing, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held: 
Visitation is primarily for the benefit 
of the child, and ordinarily a support 
order must be paid even if the custodial 
parent wrongfully denies the non-
custodial parent's right to visitation. 
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The custodial parent's misconduct cannot 
destroy the child's right to support, 
nor may child support payments be used 
as a weapon to force a child's 
visitation with a non-custodial parent. 
The duty to support one's minor child is 
a continuing obligation. Entitlement to 
child support is not contingent upon 
visitation rights. 
Hester v. Hester, 663 P.2d 727, 729 (Okla. 1983) (emphasis 
added) (overruling Irby v. Irby, 629 P. 2d 813 (Okla. App. 
1981)). 
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Wyoming recently reviewed 
the weight of authority on the issue of child support and 
concluded: 
While many older cases hold to the 
contrary, the modern view is that the 
denial of visitation rights by the 
custodial parent or the child does not 
constitute a change in circumstances 
which justifies the reduction or 
termination of the noncustodial parent's 
support obligation. 
Brovles v. Brovles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1127 (Wyo. 1985). 
Numerous other state courts have made similar rulings, a 
sample of which includes the following: Marie C. G. v. Guy L., 
133 Misc. 2d 291, 506 N.Y.S. 2d 547 (1986); State ex rel. 
Southwell v. Chamberland, 361 N.W.2d 814 (Minn. 1985); Flynn v. 
Flynn, 15 Ohio App. 3d 34, 472 N.E.2d 388 (1984); Coleman v. 
Burnett, 169 Ga. App. 297, 312 S.E.2d 627 (1983); State ex rel. 
Williams v. Williams, 647 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. App. 1983); and Appert 
v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986). 
The policy rationale behind the above-cited decisions, 
which have declared the support obligation to be independent of 
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visitation rights, is identical to that stated in Utah decisions 
and is simply that the welfare of the child is paramount. This 
is not to say, however, that the non-custodial parent whose 
visitation rights have been impeded is left without remedy. 
C. A Non-custodial Parent has Proper Remedies to 
Enforce Visitation Rights. 
When a custodial parent interferes with the visitation 
rights of a non-custodial parent, the non-custodial parent may 
initiate legal action to enforce compliance with the terms of 
the custody decree. The court may then use its contempt power 
against the custodial parent to enforce visitation privileges. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals contemplated this situation, and 
declared: 
Though the Court may use its contempt 
power against the custodial parent to 
enforce visitation privileges, a 
contempt citation might well be useless 
where, as here, the children now refuse 
to see the non-custodial parent— 
either on their own volition or as a 
result of the explicit or implicit 
urging of the custodial parent. In any 
event, the welfare of the children is 
paramount. The duty of a noncustodial 
parent to support his or her children is 
contingent only upon the needs of the 
children and the ability of each of the 
parents to provide support — and is not 
dependent upon the opportunity of the 
parent to exercise visitation 
privileges. 
Matter of Marriage of Dooley, 30 Or. App. 989, 569 P.2d 627, 629 
(1977) (emphasis added). 
In the present case, respondent failed to utilize the 
proper methods available to him in the courts to remedy his 
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visitation problem. Had he done so, and the proper remedy still 
proved insufficient to resolve the problem, in such an extreme 
circumstance further remedy might have been appropriate. For 
example, in Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974), the 
court "suspended" payment of support until the custodial parent 
was purged of contempt. The court in Peterson did not, however, 
relieve the non-custodial parent of his support obligation. A 
remedy such as temporary suspension of payments is extreme and 
should be imposed only under circumstances where the welfare of 
the child would not be jeopardized. The Peterson case turned on 
the contempt issue, but in the present case defendant did not 
use the procedures available to him and a contempt citation was 
never issued. If Peterson had turned simply on general prin-
ciples of equity, however, the Race decision, as more current 
authority, would resolve the issue in favor of the plaintiff in 
the present case. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S RECOVERY IN THE PRESENT CASE IS NOT 
BARRED BY LACHES, ACQUIESENCE OR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. 
The 1956 case of Larsen v. Larsenf 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P.2d 
596 (Utah 1956), raises the issue of whether Utah courts will 
recognize laches, acquiesence or equitable estoppel as a means 
of denying judgment for unpaid child support. Larsen involved 
an allegation by a non-custodial parent that the custodial 
parent refused to accept support payments and affirmatively 
represented to him that she had remarried and that her new 
husband was supporting the child and that "all she wanted from 
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the defendant is that he should refrain from trying to see her 
or the child." Id. at 596. The non-custodial parent agreed to 
this arrangement and further alleged that he relied on such 
representations and remarried and undertook obligations which he 
would not otherwise have undertaken. On that basis, the trial 
court excused the delinquent child support on the theory of 
laches, acquiesence and equitable estoppel. On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court because of inadequate 
findings on the issues of laches, acquiesence or estoppel. 
The Larsen court did not hold that a parent may give up 
his visitation rights and thereby be relieved of his support 
obligation, but it does appear to support the notion that if a 
custodial parent voluntarily assumes the support obligation of a 
non-custodial parent in exchange for the relinquishing by the 
non-custodial parent of his visitation privileges, then the 
custodial parent may thereafter be barred from trying to 
reimpose the support obligation on the non-custodial parent. In 
the present case, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
plaintiff in any way agreed to provide full support for the 
minor children in exchange for defendant's abandonment of his 
visitation rights. Similarly, there is no evidence that 
defendant agreed to give up his visitation rights. In fact, 
defendant's chief complaint is that his visitation rights had 
been interfered with. Therefore, even if Larsen were still good 
law in light of Race, it would certainly not apply in the 
present case. 
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Twenty years after Larsen, the Utah Supreme Court decided 
the case of Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976). In 
that case, the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the trial court's 
finding that the plaintiff's action did not seek to enforce the 
children's right of support and that the case was factually 
similar to Larsen in that the plaintiff agreed to waive child 
support if the defendant would leave her and her family alone. 
Defendant agreed to do so and the trial court found that "the 
father pleaded a valid contract of settlement therefor, and/or 
an equitable estoppel or waiver thereof." Id. at 895. The 
plaintiff in Wasescha was not seeking reimbursement of child 
support, rather, she wanted unpaid child support to be placed in 
an education trust fund for the children. The plaintiff and her 
new husband had completely taken over support of the child as 
per an agreement with the defendant that he would no longer 
exercise visitation rights. In affirming the trial court, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
We think the facts of this case comport 
favorably with the decision of the trial 
court and. principles enunciated in the 
whorl of debatable wisdom espoused in 
Larsen v. Larsen (supra), Price v. 
Price, Baas v. Anderson, and others. 
Each case hangs on a spider thread of 
that which the spider thinks is right to 
spin. One thing certain: The right to 
barter away a child's claim to support 
is not a commodity in the market overt, 
but if that claim has been satisfied by 
one not claiming reimbursement nor by 
one claiming the children were denied 
the right, it is no longer subject to 
double sale by double talk or flight 
from equity. 
15 
Id,, at 896 (emphasis added). 
This language makes it clear that the Supreme Court 
considered its prior decision in Larsen to be based on the 
thinnest of grounds and its holding in Wasescha was that equi-
table estoppel or waiver would apply only where the court finds 
a contractual agreement to release the obligation of child 
support and where that support obligation has been adequately 
assumed by another. 
In the present case, no such contractual arrangement 
existed. Comparing the Larsen line of cases with the case at 
hand is essentially comparing apples with oranges. Even if 
Larsen applied to the facts of the present case, the principles 
of Larsen would be in direct conflict with those articulated by 
the Utah Supreme Court less than two years ago in Race v. Race, 
and would be overruled thereby. 
CONCLUSION 
The case of Race v. Race is controlling in the present 
circumstances, and holds that child support payments are the 
right of the child and may not be contingent upon a parent's 
ability to exercise visitation rights. No matter how egregious 
the actions of a custodial parent may be, the rights and welfare 
of the child are paramount, and the non-custodial parent may 
pursue proper remedies which do not infringe upon the child's 
right to support in order to rectify a visitation dispute. 
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Therefore, plaintiff-appellant respectfully requests that 
portion of the trial court's Order and Judgment which refused to 
award judgment for the $3,520.00 in unpaid child support, be 
reversed and that the trial court be ordered to enter judgment 
in favor of plaintiff in that amount. 
DATED this I \ day of June, 1989. 
D7 DA3«6 LAMfeE^ R"^ , for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS tyPETERSEN 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHARLEEN iVL McREYNOLDS 
aka SHARLEEN COLTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GLENN L. McREYNOLDS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. CV-87-352 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable George E. Ballif on the 
18th day of May, 1988. The plaintiff was present and represented by her attorney, 
Michael Petro. The defendant was present and represented by his attorney, Richard B. 
Johnson. The Court discussed with counsel the issues framed by the Pre-trial Order 
and other matters desired by both sides to be brought before the Court and proceeded 
to hear evidence. The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, now makes and enters the following: 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
1. The Court adopts the stipulation of the parties and awards judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff against the defendant in the sum of $1,120.00 for child support 
accruing through July, 1986. 
2. The Court concludes that the amount to which the plaintiff would 
otherwise be entitled for child support accruing from August of 1986 through the end 
of May, 1988, is the sum of $3,520.00. 
3. The Court concludes that the plaintiff and her current husband have 
purposefully intimidated the defendant and frustrated his attempts to visit with his 
children by repeatedly changing their address and telephone numbers, forcing calls 
about the children through plaintiff's present husband and a law firm answering and 
forwarding facility, and have not cooperated in meeting scheduled telephone calls from 
defendant and the children as ordered by Domestic Relations Commissioner, all of 
which have caused defendant considerable anxiety, expenditure of time and expense 
which could have been avoided by reasonable efforts on the part of the plaintiff and 
her husband to afford him his visitation rights. 
4. In that regard, the Court concludes that the claims of the defendant are 
substantially true as it related to his frustrated visitation with his minor children over 
a period of time from July, 1986 through the present time. The Court, therefore, 
concludes that the accrued support for the period between July and the present time as 
found in the sum of $3,520.00 cannot, in good conscience, be allowed the plaintiff 
because of the conduct of the parties in which she has been principally responsible in 
denying rights of visitation to the defendant. 
5. The Court concludes that there has been a material change of cir-
cumstances in that the children are older and that the expense of their care has 
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increased since the original Order of support was entered. Considering the income of 
the respective parties as set forth in the Court's decision and the guidance of the 1987 
child support schedule prepared by the Division of Recovery Services the Court 
concludes that the sum of $150.00 per child (three children, two plaintiff's custody) 
would be an appropriate sum for the defendant to pay for the support of his minor 
children commencing June of 1988. 
6. The Court concludes that the obligation to First Security Bank on the 
Visa card in the amount of $421.69 was to be paid by the defendant inasmuch as 
paragraph 4 of the Davis County Judgment orders defendant to assume and pay and 
hold plaintiff harmless of all debts incurred during the course of the marriage. 
7. The plaintiff and defendant shall provide coverage for medical and 
health insurance through whatever source is available to them through employment. 
The defendant's insurance, if any, shall be the primary carrier and the plaintiff's 
insurance, if any, the secondary coverage. In the event that here is no coverage, or 
there are excess amounts of expense, each party is responsible for the one-half of the 
necessary medical expenditures including dental expense. 
8. The Court concludes that the Decree and prior Orders in the case should 
be amended to fix the visitation of the defendant with the minor children, The Court 
concludes the Visitation Order shall be as follows: 
(a) While the defendant resides out of the State of Utah, he is 
entitled to one weekend per month visitation with the children provided 
he is given 30 days notice of the intent to exercise such visitation and 
specifically designate the weekend which shall commence at 6:00 p.m. 
Friday and terminated at 9:00 p.m. the following Sunday. This visitation 
may be exercised only upon the defendant posting a certified letter to 
plaintiff not less than 30 days in advance of the commencement of the 
intended weekend visitation. 
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(b) Defendant is entitled to visitation with the children for one week 
during the spring school break, every other year commencing with the 
year 1989. This visitation may be exercised in Utah or if desired, at 
the defendant's expense, for transportation to the State of California. 
(c) Defendant is further entitled to one week of the Christmas 
vacation, the first week considered to be from the first of the Christmas 
holiday to 12:00 noon on Christmas Day at which time the second week 
of visitation shall commence. This visitation shall begin with Christmas 
of 1988 at which time defendant's visitation shall commence at noon on 
Christmas Day until the day following New Year's Day. Plaintiff shall 
be responsible for the travel expense of the children to defendant's 
place of residence and the defendant shall be responsible for return 
transportation. 
(d) Defendant shall be entitled to not less than two weeks visitation 
with the children during the summer vacation, which he must designate 
by certified letter to the plaintiff at least one month prior to the 
commencement of the summer vacation. Defendant is responsible for 
transportation to and from the residence of the children and his 
residence for the summer vacation. 
(e) Any additional visitation days or additional time in the summer 
may be agreed to between the parties if both subscribe to a written 
documents so providing and subscribed to by each party. 
(f) Telephone visitation once a week on Sundays from 7:45 to 8:15 
p.m. Utah time limited to 15 minutes duration. 
(g) All visitation periods shall be exercised in a prompt manner so 
that both parties can make their plans accordingly. The non-custodial 
parent shall pick the children up from the front steps of the custodial 
parent's residence no earlier than 15 minutes prior and no later than 15 
minutes after the visitation period commences. Return of the children 
to the front steps of the custodial parent's residence shall also be 
subject to the 15 minute rule. The custodial parent shall also be subject 
to the 15 minute rule. The custodial parent shall have the children fed 
and ready on time for visitation with sufficient clothing packed and 
ready for the visitation period. 
(h) In the event the children are ill and unable to visit, a makeup 
visitation will be allowed to the non-custodial parent on the next 
succeeding weekend. However, if the non-custodial parent fails for any 
reason not to exercise his visitation for reasons of health or for any 
other reason, there will be no makeup visitation. 
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(i) The children will not be permitted to determine whether they 
wish to visit with the non-custodial parent. Personal plans of the 
custodial parent or children, school activities, church activities, or other 
consideration will not be reasons for failing to adhere to the visitation 
scheduled set forth in the Order. Only substantial medical reasons will 
be considered sufficient for postponement of visitation. 
(j) Both parties will provide addresses and contact telephone numbers 
to the other party and will immediately notify the other party of any 
emergency circumstances of substantial changes in the health of the 
children. 
(k) The non-custodial parent shall, in addition to the visitation set 
forth in this Order, have the unlimited right to correspond with the 
minor children of the parties.. 
9. Both parties are restrained and enjoined form making derogatory and 
disparaging comments about the other party or, in any way, diminishing the love, 
respect, and affection that the children have for either party. 
10. Contact for visitation arrangements are not to be made through Paul 
Colton, plaintiff's husband. 
11. The Court makes no other Order on the medical or dental needs other 
than those hereinabove provided for. 
12. Each side shall bear their own costs and attorney's fees in this matter. 
13. Interest shall be awarded plaintiff on the judgment award in paragraph 1 
above in the amount of $336.00, calculated according to the principles set forth in 
Stroud v. Stroud. 738 P.2d 649 (Utah 1987), together with judgment interest at the rate 
of twelve percent (12%) per annum from October 1, 1988. 
14. Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-45d-l et. seq. plaintiff shall be entitled to 
mandatory income withholding against defendant's income for payment of the support 
order made herein in accordance with the provisions of said statute. 
DATED this ZI "^dav of October, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
GEORG&'E. BALLfF 
District Court Judge 
-Z^a 
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